<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Sast on Samarthya</title><link>https://samarthya.me/tags/sast/</link><description>Recent content in Sast on Samarthya</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>© Samarthya 2018-2026. All rights reserved.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 20:32:15 -0400</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://samarthya.me/tags/sast/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>SSDLC when exploits are cheap: a working concept</title><link>https://samarthya.me/posts/ssdlc-in-the-age-of-ai-exploits/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 20:32:15 -0400</pubDate><guid>https://samarthya.me/posts/ssdlc-in-the-age-of-ai-exploits/</guid><description>&lt;div class="lead text-neutral-500 dark:text-neutral-400 !mb-9 text-xl"&gt;&#10; A fire inspection once a year works when fires are rare. When sparks are falling every day, you need smoke&#10;detectors in every room, a sprinkler that fixes the small ones by itself, and a person who decides what to do&#10;about the big ones. That is what a secure development life cycle has to become.&#10;&lt;/div&gt;&#10;&#10;&lt;p&gt;These are my notes for a question I keep coming back to: &lt;strong&gt;how do you keep shipping software when new&#10;vulnerabilities arrive faster than you can fix them, and attackers can use an LLM to turn a CVE description into&#10;a working exploit?&lt;/strong&gt; There is no single standard answer. What follows is the concept I would build, with the&#10;evidence behind each choice and the parts where I am still unsure.&lt;/p&gt;</description><media:content xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://samarthya.me/posts/ssdlc-in-the-age-of-ai-exploits/feature.png"/></item><item><title>From finding to fix: Black Duck pull requests on GitHub Enterprise Server</title><link>https://samarthya.me/posts/ghes-blackduck-fix-prs/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 20:05:18 -0400</pubDate><guid>https://samarthya.me/posts/ghes-blackduck-fix-prs/</guid><description>&lt;div class="lead text-neutral-500 dark:text-neutral-400 !mb-9 text-xl"&gt;&#10; A vulnerability report that nobody reads is a smoke alarm with no battery. The goal is not more findings. The&#10;goal is a pull request that a developer can review and merge before lunch.&#10;&lt;/div&gt;&#10;&#10;&#10;&lt;h2 class="relative group"&gt;Why this post&#10; &lt;div id="why-this-post" class="anchor"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&#10; &#10; &lt;span&#10; class="absolute top-0 w-6 transition-opacity opacity-0 -start-6 not-prose group-hover:opacity-100 select-none"&gt;&#10; &lt;a class="text-primary-300 dark:text-neutral-700 !no-underline" href="#why-this-post" aria-label="Anchor"&gt;#&lt;/a&gt;&#10; &lt;/span&gt;&#10; &#10;&lt;/h2&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;SentinelOne&amp;rsquo;s&#10;&lt;a href="https://www.sentinelone.com/cybersecurity-101/cybersecurity/github-vulnerability-management/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"&gt;overview of GitHub vulnerability management&lt;/a&gt;&#10;describes the job as &amp;ldquo;discovering, triaging, and remediating security vulnerabilities in GitHub repositories,&#10;dependencies, and workflows&amp;rdquo;. It lists the usual native tools: Dependabot, code scanning, secret scanning and&#10;security advisories. It also admits the gaps: no asset inventory or risk scoring, and dependencies that&#10;Dependabot cannot track.&lt;/p&gt;</description><media:content xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://samarthya.me/posts/ghes-blackduck-fix-prs/feature.png"/></item></channel></rss>